























COMPENSATING LOSSES AND SHARING SURPLUSES IN 
PROJECT-ALLOCATION SITUATIONS 
 























ISSN 0924-7815 Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in
Project-allocation Situations1
Yuan Ju2 Pieter H.M. Ruys3 Peter Borm4
March 2004
1The authors thank Ren¶ e van den Brink, Eric van Damme, Robert P. Gilles and Youwei Li
for stimulating conversations and valuable comments. For helpful discussions on early drafts, we
also thank the seminar participants at Tilburg University, Universit¶ e de Toulouse 1, the 14th
International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook, the EEA-ESEM Conference in Stock-
holm and the 30th EARIE Conference in Helsinki. Of course, the authors are responsible for the
remaining de¯ciencies of the paper. The ¯nancial support from TWM is gratefully acknowledged.
2CentER for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research,
Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Tel: +31-13-4663244,
Fax: +31-13-4663280, E-mail: Y.Ju@uvt.nl
3TILEC, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, and Tias Business School,
Tilburg University. E-mail: P.H.M.Ruys@uvt.nl
4CentER for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research,
Tilburg University, E-mail: P.E.M.Borm@uvt.nlAbstract
By introducing the notions of projects and shares, this paper studies a class of economic
environments, the so-called project-allocation situations, in which society may pro¯t from
cooperation, i.e., by reallocating the initial shares of projects among agents. This paper
mainly focuses on the associated issues of compensation of losses and surplus sharing
arising from the reallocation of projects. For this purpose, we construct and analyze an
associated project-allocation game and a related system of games that explicitly models
the underlying cooperative process. Speci¯c solution concepts are proposed.
JEL classi¯cation codes: C71, H70
Keywords: projects-allocation situations/games; loss compensation; surplus sharing.1 Introduction
This paper has two aims. Firstly, it develops a general framework for studying a class
of economic environments in which coalitions of agents are optimally reassigned to some
bundles of projects: project-allocation situations. Secondly, since this reassignment causes
some agents losing jobs or positions, we analyze the problems associated with valuating
such reshu²ing, such as compensation for losses and sharing surpluses arising from the
enhanced e±ciency.
In an economy characterized by changing capabilities and preferences of agents and
changing technology embodied in projects, people need to continuously adapt their posi-
tions to obtain e±ciency. That is how our societies have evolved into prosperity. Every
change in the production structure requires a reshu²ing of responsibilities, which is hard or
impossible to implement if possible \losers" are not su±ciently compensated to cooperate.
Only when all parties gain from the reassignment, is it a win-win situation. Examples are
abundant. Similarly, when extra pro¯t is generated simply by cooperation after reshu²ing,
a surplus sharing problem occurs.
Obviously, solving the problems of compensation and surplus sharing is essential for
creating and maintaining °exibility and creating e±ciency in an economy. However, gen-
erally speaking, the two concepts are not well distinguished in theoretical research so that
the corresponding practical problems can not be treated adequately. In a strict sense,
compensation refers to a ¯nancial remuneration to an agent for the loss caused by her
being removed from some project. On the other hand, surplus sharing deals with the extra
bene¯ts created by cooperation among agents assigned to some combination of projects,
which bene¯ts are in excess of the sum of individual payo®s. Hence, if compensation
is not properly distinguished from bene¯t/surplus sharing, some individuals may lose on
the whole after a reshu²ing. Those individuals will strongly oppose and obstruct such a
reshu²ing. If there exists an authority who can impose reassignments from above, without
minding too much about individual sacri¯ces, the overall approach is su±cient. But even
then there are several value concepts available that have a characteristic in°uence on the
outcome. That will be our point of departure.
One may observe that trade unions have forced ¯rms to adopt generic rules for laborers
that include some compensation for lay-o®s in a ¯rm, as well as labor laws and other safety
nets on the macro-level. Our paper focuses on the micro-level. We assume that gains and
losses for every particular situation can be endogenously speci¯ed and may serve as a basis
for the issues of compensation of losses and surplus sharing.
Consider, for example, a restaurant and a boat company, working independently, both
situated on the shore of the same beautiful lake. The restaurant, project A, is operated
1by agent 1 who can be understood as a group of managers, waiters and kitchen sta®.
Agent 2, a group of people as well, manages project B, the boat company. They are
considering collaboration and have two proposals. The ¯rst one is simply setting up a joint
lunch-sightseeing program, f1A;2Bg that will bene¯t both parties. The second proposal
is more involved and induces a reshu²ing of the two projects, i.e. the restaurant and
the boat company. Since agent 2 has excellent expertise in both travelling and restaurant
management, much more pro¯t will be generated if the restaurant is also managed by her.
The technical possibilities in this situation are represented in the following diagram:
f1Ag f2Bg f1A;2Bg f1;2A;Bg
5 10 18 26
Note that the two types of cooperation, f1A;2Bg and f1;2A;Bg are di®erent in nature:
the former corresponds to the ¯rst proposal where those two agents have their own projects
and coordinate with each other; the latter can be understood as that agent 1 renders A to
agent 2 and then works with 2 (just on his human capital). Whereas the ¯rst proposal only
entails a surplus sharing problem, the second one is further complicated by the problem of
compensating agent 1 for giving up his access or user rights of the restaurant project.
This paper analyzes both the loss compensation and surplus sharing problem as illus-
trated by the second proposal in the above example from a cooperative game theoretic
point of view. In our framework, the value of some coalition of agents crucially depends on
the involvement of the agents in this coalition in a well-de¯ned set of projects. The involve-
ment is measured by the notion of an agent's shares in projects. That de¯nes a so-called
project-allocation situation (in short, P-A situation) and an associated project-allocation
game (in short, P-A game). The value function of the project-allocation game is derived
from the underlying pro¯t functions for every coalition given a speci¯c share pro¯le of the
projects. So in particular, the value function of this game can be viewed as a generalization
of the neoclassical pro¯t function, with labor and capital as inputs and with prices given.
Naturally, any speci¯c solution concept for a cooperative TU (transferable utility) game
may of course be applied to solve project-allocation games, and implicitly solve the com-
bined loss compensation and surplus sharing problems. (The combined compensation and
surplus sharing problem corresponding to the second proposal in the above example can
be modelled as a TU game in which v(f1;2g) equals 26, the joint value generated by the
cooperation between agent 1 and agent 2 after agent 1 transferred the restaurant project
to agent 2.) We restrict our attention to two additive one-point solution concepts: the
Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the consensus value (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)).
Arguments for the suitability of these rules in this speci¯c context are provided.
2However, since P-A games are just a partial abstraction of P-A situations, this tradi-
tional approach is incapable of disentangling all necessary details to adequately model the
basic mechanisms concerning the physical reallocation of projects (loss compensation) and
cooperation in joint projects (surplus sharing). In fact, the process to realize the maximal
gain of a coalition is a blackbox. Therefore, in order to make the framework operational
for solving practical problems, one further step has to be made. By explicitly incorporat-
ing an underlying cooperative structure in terms of project reallocation and cooperation
afterwards, we devise two di®erent stages in such a way that the loss compensation due to
project reallocation and the sharing of extra surplus from cooperation can be clearly and
logically distinguished. Hence, this two stage approach makes voluntary acceptance of a
reshu²ing and a bottom up approach possible, and is even more compelling if reassignment
means that agents are laid o® and have no chance to participate in the bene¯t sharing. For
each of the two stages, a game is constructed.1 Consistently, the same solution concept
is applied to each of the stage games. Thus, following a general stage approach, also a
solution concept for the combined problem is obtained.
Although there exists some fundamental work that is helpful for our research, it seems
that the problem of compensating losses has largely been ignored in economic research.
The analysis of cost sharing situations (cf. Moulin (1987), Tijs and Branzei (2002)) and
linear production situations (Owen (1975)) is in the same spirit but does not explicitly
discriminate between the problems of surplus sharing and loss compensation. An exception
in a somewhat di®erent context is the work on sequencing games (Curiel et al (1989),
Hamers (1995), Klijn (2000)). In this framework, time slots could be considered as projects.
Agents change the initial order (shares or rights on time slots) into an optimal one so that
the individual payo®s are changed and compensation is needed. Moreover, since joint total
costs decrease as well, also the issue of surplus sharing becomes prominent.
In addition to this section introducing the problem and reviewing the literature brie°y,
the remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present
the main analytical framework by formally introducing project-allocation situations and
de¯ne project-allocation games. Section 3 addresses the possible solution concepts. Section
4 distinguishes stages to explicitly solve the problems of compensation and surplus sharing
in project-allocation situations separately. The ¯nal section provides an example of public-
private partnerships, which indicates an interesting application of the framework into real
economic issues.
1The combined problem in the above example can be decomposed into two stages. The ¯rst stage
considers project reallocation such that agent 1 only renders his A project to agent 2 but does not make
further cooperation. The second stage may correspond to a new situation: imagine that agent 1 does not
have any project while agent 2 has both A and B; now agent 2 would like agent 1 to work for her.
32 Project-allocation situations and P-A games
Consider a situation in which there exists a ¯nite set N of agents/players who can operate
a ¯nite set M of projects. We use the word \project" in this paper in a very general
sense. A project is a speci¯c entity that can be exploited or operated for some purpose(s)
(and mostly for value-creation). It can be a machine, a research project, a ¯rm, or a
public utility, etc. Generally, a project can either be divisible or indivisible. A project
is divisible if it is capable of being separated into parts and can be partially operated
or owned by some party, without loss of its original function. For instance, a tree farm
as a project can be perfectly divided among agents. Indivisibility means that for the
purpose of value-creation, a project can only be completely owned or exploited as a whole.
A truck is then an indivisible project because it will lose the basic function if divided
into parts. Since divisibility is a context-dependent concept which may imply physical
divisibility, operational divisibility or ownership divisibility, we have to point out that this
paper focuses on the operational divisibility.
The basic idea of a project-allocation situation is that individual agents from the set N
have received user rights to operate individual projects from the set M. Each such agent-
project combination results in an outcome, called a payo®. Agents may also cooperate and
form a coalition that operates a bundle of projects. Since both the agents and the projects
are specialized, some agent-project combinations may generate a higher payo® than other
combinations. So, for a given assignment of user rights over agents, each coalition of
agents operates a speci¯c bundle of projects, which generates a payo®. When, however,
some coalition would perform better when it is assigned another bundle of projects, then
a feasible reshu²ing of coalitions of agents may increase the e±ciency of the situation.
This problem of project-allocation is formalized as follows. Each agent receives a share
in each project, which is a real number ½i;k between 0 and 1, indicating2 the fraction of
project k that agent i may use or operate. If the agent has an exclusive right, respectively no
right on the project, the share equals 1, respectively 0. If the agent has to share rights with
other agents in N, and the project is divisible, the fraction corresponds with the distribution
of the project over the agents, satisfying the feasibility restriction
P
i2N ½i;k · 1. For
instance, one agent may own half of a project, the share is then 0:5. If the project is not
divisible and assigned to a coalition S of agents, then the project is - ¯ctitiously - equally
distributed among the agents in S. So in that case the individual share ½i;k equals 1=jSj,
2However, we do not restrict the implications of shares, or in another sentence, we do not give a
de¯nite economic interpretation but only care about how the shares (in a general sense) in projects that
agents have will a®ect cooperation or even determine compensation and surplus sharing. It may have
di®erent meanings in di®erent contexts. For example, it can also represent the ownership/property rights
or managerial rights.
4for all i 2 S. This allows for describing each agent's share in any indivisible project and for
solving the problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing in such cases mathematically.
That is, despite that an indivisible project can not be divided in itself, the value generated
from it can be shared among the agents who jointly own it in some way.
The assignment of individual user rights for operating individual projects to the agents
in N is thus speci¯ed by an N £ M matrix3 ½, called a share pro¯le. The set of share







½i;k · 1;8k 2 M
)
(1)
A share pro¯le determines feasible agent-project combinations. Feasibility is integrated
with technical performance by the following function. The map f½ : 2N ¡! R, assigning
for any share pro¯le ½ in R, to any coalition S in N, a real number - the payo® - is called
the payo® function under share pro¯le ½. So f½(S) is the payo® of coalition S under share
pro¯le ½. An empty coalition has a zero payo®. Specialization implies that an arbitrary
bundle of agent-project combinations may neither be optimal: other combinations may
perform better; nor feasible: according to the given share pro¯le it may not have access to
projects required for a performance, in which case the payo® equals 0.
Thus, feasible reshu²ing of a share pro¯le is required to obtain optimality or e±ciency.
For that purpose we de¯ne the concept of a feasible allocation. Let an initial share pro¯le
½0 in R be given. A reallocation of shares within some coalition S in N is called feasible
for S, if the sum of initially allocated shares in each project to the agents in S equals the
sum of the reallocated shares in each corresponding project to the agents in S, while the
other agents in N keep their initial shares. So, the set of feasible allocations or feasible

















For notational simplicity, we use F(S) if there is no confusion about ½0. Thus, feasibility
means that agents can re-arrange their shares in projects subject to the capacity determined
by the initial share pro¯le within the coalition they participate in, without a®ecting the
allocations outside the coalition.
Based on the above description, we are able to de¯ne a project-allocation situation.
3Given agent set N of size n and project set M of size m, ½ is in fact an n£m matrix. We use N £M
to emphasize that ½ is a matrix associated to agent set and project set. The same explanation applies in
cases of other matrices, for instance, when we say that ½S is an S £ M matrix.
5De¯nition 2.1 A project-allocation situation P(½0) is a tuple (N;M;R;½0;ff½g½2R), where
N is the set of agents, M is the set of projects, R is the set of share pro¯les, ½0 is the
initial share pro¯le, and f½ : 2N ¡! R is the payo® function under a share pro¯le ½ 2 R.
For analytical convenience, we use the following assumptions at di®erent stages.
Assumption 1 (continuity):
for any S 2 2N, f½(S) is continuous with respect to the share pro¯le ½ 2 R.
So a small change in the share pro¯le has only a small e®ect on the value distribution.
Assumption 2 (no externality among coalitions):
f½1(S) = f½2(S),
for all S 2 2N, whenever ½1
S = ½2
S.
Here ½S is the S £ M submatrix of ½. It follows that the distribution of values within
a coalition is independent from the share pro¯le outside that coalition.
Assumption 3 (gains from cooperation):
f½(S [ T) ¸ f½(S) + f½(T),
for all ½ 2 R and for all S;T 2 2N with S \ T = ;.
Assumption 4 (ordinary cooperation):





for all ½1;½2 2 R and for all S 2 2N.
The last assumption means that if a share pro¯le is preferable for a coalition of players
in cooperation, then the corresponding stand-alone situation is also preferable in terms of
the sum of their individual payo®s. It can be understood as a type of consistency between
cooperation and its stand-alone basis.
The class of all project-allocation situations with player set N and project set M and
the payo® functions satisfying the above assumptions is denoted by PASN;M.
The project-allocation situation P(½0) provides room for reshu²ing and optimizing the
initial share pro¯le ½0. This reallocation process can be described as a TU game, in which
the value of a coalition is de¯ned as the maximal payo® that this coalition can achieve by
means of feasible share pro¯le.
Given a project-allocation situation P(½0) = (N;M;R;½0;ff½g½2R) 2 PASN;M, the





6for all coalitions S in N with v(;) = 0, is called a project-allocation (P-A) game.
A share pro¯le ½ 2 F(S) with f½(S) = v(S) is called an optimal share pro¯le for
coalition S, denoted by ½¤(S).
We want to note that despite the fact that there may exist multiple optimal share
pro¯les for a coalition, the corresponding value for the coalition is uniquely determined.
The P-A games in this paper are endowed with the following property.
Proposition 2.2 Project-allocation games are superadditive.
Proof. Let P(½0) = (N;M;R;½0;ff½g½2R) be a project-allocation situation and let the
corresponding P-A game be given by (N;v). We need to show v(S [T) ¸ v(S) + v(T) for
all S;T in N with S \ T = ;.
Consider optimal share pro¯les ½¤(S [ T), ½¤(S) and ½¤(T) for coalitions S [ T, S, T,
respectively. Since S\T = ;, we can construct a new share pro¯le ~ ½ 2 F(S [ T) such that
~ ½S = ½¤
S(S) and ~ ½T = ½¤





~ ½(S [ T)
¸ f





= v(S) + v(T)
3 Solution concepts for project-allocation games
In this section, we consider two related solution concepts: the well known Shapley value ©
and a newly introduced solution concept, called the consensus value °.
Let TUN denote the class of all TU games with player set N. Recall that the Shapley








for all v 2 TUN. Here ¦(N) denotes the set of all bijections ¾ : f1;2;:::;jNjg ¡! N of N
and the marginal vector m¾(v) 2 RN, for ¾ 2 ¦(N), is de¯ned by
m
¾
¾(k) := v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g) ¡ v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k ¡ 1)g)
7for all k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
When we go over the de¯nition and the properties of the Shapley value, we can ¯nd
that it may not be entirely adequate to analyze the project-allocation situations mainly by
the following two reasons.
Firstly, the Shapley value relies on the basic notion of marginal vectors. Here, given
some ordering of players entering a game, the payo®s are determined by the marginal
contributions, which is not satisfying in a constructive or bargaining type of physical setting
since a later entrant gets the whole surplus. In a superadditive game, the incumbents will
not accept such an arrangement as their contributions are not re°ected. While if a game
is subadditive, the entrant will not accept such a contract. Apparently, in the practice
of a project-allocation situation, a marginal vector is even harder to implement as it may
involve reshu²ing of projects by current incumbents.
Secondly, the dummy property does not seem too imperative in P-A situations. Rather,
this purely utilitarian requirement assigning nothing more than the individual value to a
dummy player may hinder the possible collaborations in a P-A situation. Payo®s can only
be veri¯ed after actual project reallocations. Each agent can be a dummy player, while
no one would like to pay e®ort for nothing. Furthermore, the balance in tradeo® between
utilitarianism and egalitarianism is also critical in real life situations.
We propose an alternative solution concept for TU games: the consensus value. This
rule follows from a natural and simple idea to share coalition values. For more information
including an axiomatic characterization of this solution concept, we refer to Ju, Borm and
Ruys (2004).
Consider the following 3-player example. We ¯rst have two players: 1 and 2. They
cooperate with each other and form a coalition f1;2g. The coalition value v(f1;2g) is
generated. Suppose now player 3 enters the scene, who would like to cooperate with
player 1 and 2. But because the coalition f1;2g has been already formed before she
enters the game, player 3 will actually cooperate with the existing coalition f1;2g in-
stead of simply cooperating with 1 and 2 individually (Consensus is needed here). If
f1;2g agrees as well, the coalition value v(f1,2,3g) will be generated. How to share
it between f3g and f1;2g? Generally, no rule is better than splitting the joint surplus
v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g) equally and assigning half to each of the two parties in
addition to their own values (Consensus is obtained once again). Then, what remains (the
so-called remainder) for f1;2g is 1
2 (v(f1;2;3g) + v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g)). Apparently, 1 and





2 (v(f1;2;3g) + v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g)) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)
¢
. Extending this argument4
4Indeed, this argument is based on a backward process. Alternatively, we can construct a forward
8to an n-player case, we then have a general method, which can be understood as a stan-
dardized remainder rule as we take the 2-player game standard solution as a base and apply
it to solving games by taking the existing coalition as one player. Furthermore, since no
order is pre-determined for a TU game, we take all possible ordering of players into account
and average the corresponding outcomes, which serves as the ¯nal payo® for players.
Formally, this rule is de¯ned as follows. For a given ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg
we de¯ne S¾
k = f¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(k)g and S¾












k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after
allocating surplus to later entrants NnS¾
k.
We construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(v), which corresponds to
the situation where the players enter the game one by one in the order ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj)
and assign each player ¾(k), besides her individual payo® v(f¾(k)g), half of the net surplus
from the standardized remainder obtained by (the cooperation between) her and the group












if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1









A more descriptive name for the consensus value could be the average serial standardized
remainder value. In the same spirit, an alternative name for the Shapley value could be
the average serial marginal contribution value.
By Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004), surprisingly, the consensus value is in fact the average













for all i 2 N, where ©i(v) is the Shapley value of the game.
process to model the idea, which yields the same result. The consistency is provided in Ju, Borm and
Ruys (2004).
9Example 3.1 Consider a P-A situation P(½0) = (N;M;R;½0;ff½g½2R) 2 PASN;M where














½(f1g) = 10½1;A + 1½1;B + ½1;A½1;B
f
½(f2g) = 8½2;A + 3½2;B + ½2;A½2;B
f





























































It is easy to see that these payo® functions satisfy Assumption 1-4. The corresponding
P-A game is given by
S f1g f2g f3g f12g f13g f23g f123g














It is our opinion that the consensus value ¯ts quite well in the reshu²ing process and
the admission structure of the P-A situations. Consider an existing coalition S and a
new entrant i. Ex ante, S is a well formed coalition: they had reallocated projects with
each other and now cooperate well; they also share the joint surplus in some way. Now,
player i would join this coalition. What happens? Obviously, i could not work with any
sub-coalition of S but only with S as a whole since S has already been formed over there,
comparable to the case that two players cooperate. The immediate (standard) and also a
practical solution is then to share the extra revenues from the cooperation equally between
S and i.
10However, the approach to model the whole P-A situation as one cooperative game is
not completely satisfying: P-A games do not take all practical features of P-A situations
into account. The underlying process of realizing and allocating the maximal gain of the
grand coalition f½¤(N)(N) starting from the individual payo®s is still a blackbox.
4 The two stage approach: compensation and surplus
sharing
We now focus on an underlying process of obtaining and redistributing the maximal payo®
of the grand coalition f½¤(N)(N) in a project-allocation situation P(½0).






(fig); for i = 1;:::;n:
Reallocation of shares not only changes this individual value distribution based on
stand-alone activities, but also the payo® generated by new combinations of coalitions: the
surplus generated by cooperation. For determining the boundaries of individual compensa-
tion, we focus on the stand-alone situations and compare the initial stand-alone value with
the stand-alone value generated by the optimal share distribution5 ½¤(N). So the optimal




½¤(N)(fig); for i = 1;:::;n:
If the di®erence (¯¤
i ¡¯0
i ) is positive, it indicates the stand-alone gain from reallocation,
which is also the maximal compensation agent i is willing to pay to other agents. If it is
negative, it gives the stand-alone loss from reallocation, which is the minimal compensation
agent i is asking from other agents for agreeing with the reallocation of shares.
Taking ¯¤ as a watershed, we can distinguish two stages in the reshu²ing process.
The ¯rst stage considers the compensation issue while the second one focuses on surplus
sharing.
² Stage 1: The compensation game (N; ¹ w)
5As noted in Section 2, there may exist multiple optimal share pro¯les for N. For simplicity, in this
paper, we focus the analysis on the cases with unique optimal share pro¯le. For coalitions we do not
have to impose such a condition because by Assumption 4 possible multiplicity does not play a role in the
procedure.
11This stage consists of project reallocation towards the optimal share pro¯le ½¤(N) for the
grand coalition N and ¯nally yields ¯¤. To determine agents' true value in this reallocation
stage, we construct a stand-alone game, in which not only the stand-alone values for the
grand coalition are taken into account, but also the stand-alone values generated by other
coalitions. Given a P-A situation P(½0), the stand-alone game (N;w) is de¯ned by w(S) =
P






Proposition 4.1 Stand-alone games are superadditive.
Proof. Let P(½0) = (N;M;R;½0;ff½g½2R) be a project-allocation situation and let the cor-
responding stand-alone game be given by (N;w). We need to show w(S[T) ¸ w(S) + w(T)
for all S;T in N with S \ T = ;.
Let ½¤(S [T), ½¤(S) and ½¤(T) be the optimal share pro¯les for coalitions S [T, S, T,
respectively. Let ~ ½ 2 F(S [ T) be such that ~ ½S = ½¤
S(S) and ~ ½T = ½¤






























= w(S) + w(T)
Here, the inequality follows from the fact f½¤(S[T)(S[T) ¸ f ~ ½(S [ T) and Assumption 4.
In general, ¯¤ 6= ¯0; and apparently, the agents incurred losses due to project reallo-
cation need to be compensated. To explicitly determine compensations, we will consider
solutions of the associated compensation game (N; ¹ w) de¯ned by






Note that ¹ w(N) = 0. The speci¯c values of compensation depend on the solution concept
to be chosen, such as the Shapley value ©( ¹ w) or the consensus value °( ¹ w).
² Stage 2: The surplus sharing game (N; ¹ !)
12This stage considers cooperation after the reallocation in the ¯rst stage, i.e. co-working
on projects based on the optimal share pro¯le ½¤(N). This type of cooperation yields a
co-working game (N;!) de¯ned as the project-allocation game corresponding to a project-
allocation situation (N;M;R;½¤(N);ff½g½2R).
Proposition 4.2 Co-working games are superadditive.
Proof. Apparently, co-working games are superadditive as they are project-allocation
games.
Indeed, this game still takes project reallocation into consideration so that agents are
allowed to reallocate shares before joint production. However, the initial share pro¯le itself
in this situation is the optimal share pro¯le and !(N) = v(N) = f½¤(N)(N), players do
not reallocate projects in the grand coalition any more (although it may happen in theory
within sub-coalitions) but directly work with each other with their current shares. So no
compensation is needed. What entails is only surplus sharing. For this aspect, we consider




It is obvious that the two stage approach decomposes the maximal payo® of the grand
coalition into three elements: v(N) =
P
i2N ¯¤
i + ¹ w(N) + ¹ !(N).
The above description on the two stages in a project-allocation situation implies a
natural and reasonable way to share the maximal payo® f½¤(N)(N). Firstly, an agent i
has her stand-alone value after reallocation, ¯¤
i , due to optimal project reallocation. In
addition, to determine the compensations, one solves the compensation game ¹ w; and to
solve the surplus sharing problem, one solves the surplus sharing game ¹ !. A player's ¯nal
payo® is the sum of these three parts.
Solving both games with the same one-point solution concept yields a (stage-based)






i + Ãi( ¹ w) + Ãi(¹ !)
where Ã : TUN ¡! RN is a one-point solution concept for TU games.
Generally, it will be the case that the immediate application of Ã to the P-A game
v will yield a di®erent solution, i.e., Ã¤
i(P(½0)) 6= Ãi(v). One may wonder under which
conditions the equality holds and both the one stage and the two stage approach give the
same result. We require two weak conditions on Ã, i.e., Ã(0) = 0 and translation invariance
Ã(v + b) = Ã(v) + b for all v 2 TUN and b 2 RjNj (b is an additive game), and strengthen
Assumption 3 in the following way.
13Assumption 3' f is additive with respect to coalitions, i.e. f½(S [ T) = f½(S) + f½(T)
for all ½ 2 R and for all S;T in N with S \ T = ;.
Now we can show
Proposition 4.3 With Assumption 3', if Ã satis¯es translation invariance and Ã(0) = 0,
then Ã¤
i(P(½0)) = Ãi(v), for all i 2 N, where Ã, P(½0) and v are de¯ned as above.
Proof. Clearly, Assumption 3' implies that f½¤(N)(N) =
P
i2N f½¤(N)(fig). Consequently,
w(S) = v(S) for all S in N and ¹ !(S) = 0 for all S in N. What remains is obvious:
Ã¤(P(½0)) = Ã(v).







i + ©i( ¹ w) + ©i(¹ !) for all i 2 N







i + °i( ¹ w) + °i(¹ !) for all i 2 N
One may also, in principle, choose a solution concept for the compensation game that
is di®erent from the solution concept for the surplus sharing game.
5 An example: disintegration in the water sector
Let us look at an example considering the reform of disintegration and reallocation in the
water sector. In this setting, we have three players N := f1;2;3g: player 1 is a provincial
government, 2 is a local government, and 3 is a company; two projects: water business
(A) and related business (B) such as a golf club or recreation park built on the water
source land. So, M := fA;Bg. Initially, both projects are owned by the local government.












14Unlike the for-pro¯t project B, water business is usually seen as a public utility. So, the
payo® of running the water project can be interpreted as the social welfare/value instead
of individual pro¯t. Moreover, we assume that the company has speciality in operating a
commercial business while the provincial government may create higher social value if she
controls the water project. However, they do have some relative weaknesses. For example,
the private company is not good at running public utilities. This type of situation is
modelled by the corresponding payo® functions, which are provided in Example 3.1.
Without cooperation, players' individual payo®s come from two parts: the stand-alone
payo®s generated from project A or B and the payo® due to the cross-subsidy e®ect between
two projects. With cooperation, in addition to players' individual payo®s, there are some






in the payo® function of coalition f2;3g.












































One readily checks that ¯0 := (0;12;0), and ¯¤ = (10;0;5).
Moreover, beside the project-allocation game (N;v) for the whole situation in this
example, we have a compensation game and a surplus sharing game:
S f1g f2g f3g f12g f13g f23g f123g
v(S) 0 12 0 19 0 17 27
¹ w(S) ¡10 12 ¡5 3 ¡15 8 0
¹ !(S) 0 0 0 3 8 2 12

























































Hence, according to the consensus value, the local government is compensated by the
provincial government and the company with a total amount 131
6 due to project realloca-
tion, and obtains 3 1
12 from the joint surplus generated by joint production based on the
new share pro¯le.
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